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Comments
LOSS OF GOODWILL AND BUSINESS REPUTATION AS
RECOVERABLE ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES UNDER
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715-
THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a buyer is provided with
an arsenal of remedies upon a breach of contract by a seller. In
case of breach by the seller, the buyer is entitled to recover losses
resulting from the seller's breach.' If the seller's breach involves
a breach of warranty the Code provides that the buyer may re-
cover
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special cir-
cumstances show proximate damages of a different
amount.
2
If the buyer can establish special circumstances he may also re-
cover incidental and consequential damages.3
This Comment will examine recovery of loss of good will and
business reputation in damages under the consequential damages
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Comment will
analyze the refusal of Pennsylvania courts to permit recovery for
loss of good will under the Code and prior statutory enactments in
light of the decisions of courts of other jurisdictions.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-714(1) [hereinafter also referred
to as the Code].
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-714(2).
3. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-714(3).
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
The right of an aggrieved buyer to recover consequential dam-
ages is specifically provided for under the Code.4 Section 2-715 (2)
(a) of the Code provides:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or
particular requirements and needs of which the seller
at the time of contracting had reason to know and
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise.
The Code provision is substantially similar to the prior provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act.5 Under the Code a seller would be
liable for consequential damages whenever he had reason to know
particular or general requirements of the buyer at the time of con-
tractingA The burden of establishing consequential damages rests
with the aggrieved buyer. 7 The Code requires the buyer to prove
such damages in any manner which is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances but rejects "mathematical precision in the proof of
loss" as a prerequisite to recovery of consequential damages.8
THE PENNSYLVANIA VIEW
The Pennsylvania courts have adhered to a narrow interpreta-
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2).
5. Compare UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(6), (7) with UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (a). The UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69 provided:
(6) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the loss di-
rectly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events,
from the breach of warranty.
(7) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the
absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of
a greater amount, is the difference between the value of goods
at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would
have had if they had answered to the warranty.
The Uniform Sales Act was the precursor to the Uniform Commercial Code.
On enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, a state which had previ-
ously adopted the Uniform Sales Act, would expressly repeal the prior
Uniform Sales Act. See, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-102; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (2).
6. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 3. It should be
noted that the seller need not possess actual knowledge of the buyer's
general needs, reason to know of the buyer's needs is sufficient. Id.
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 3.
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 4, states:
The burden of proving the extent of loss incurred by way of con-
sequential damage is on the buyer, but the section on liberal ad-
ministration of remedies rejects any doctrine of certainty which
requires almost mathematical precision in the proof of loss. Loss
may be determined in any manner which is reasonable under
the circumstances.
Section 1-106 (1) of the Code provides:
The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered
to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a posi-
tion as if the other party had fully performed but neither conse-
quential or special nor penal damages may be had except as spe-
cifically provided in this Act or by other rule of law.
The official comments to Section 1-106(1) clearly indicate rejection of
"any doctrine that damages must be calculable with mathematical accur-
acy." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106, comment 1.
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tion of a forty-year old case decided under the Uniform Sales Act,
which denied recovery of damages for loss of good will. Over the
enusing years the Pennsylvania courts have attempted to justify
their denial of recovery for loss of good will on the grounds that
such injury is too speculative, 9 that plaintiff has not actually suf-
fered any loss,10 that the Uniform Commercial Code was not in-
tended to permit such recovery,1 and that loss of good will cannot
be gauged by the diminution in value of any specific property.
12
The Pennsylvania view has been criticized by the courts1 3 and by
the commentators. 14 It is submitted that the Pennsylvania view is
not supported by prior court decisions under the Uniform Sales Act
nor under the Uniform Commercial Code.
The origin of the Pennsylvania view may be traced to Miche-
lin Tire Co. v. Schulz. 1" In Michelin the plaintiff was the manu-
facturer of automobile tires and the defendant was a Philadelphia
tire dealer who purchased tires from the plaintiff. Plaintiff sued
to recover the balance due on the purchase price of tires pur-
chased by defendant. The defendant admitted the purchase of
plaintiff's products but sought a counterclaim in excess of $5,000
for the alleged lack of durability of the tires purchased.16 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found defendant's counterclaim to
be fatally defective in that the counterclaim failed to allege any
specific defect in the tires purchased. 17 The court also found that
there was no warranty of quality breached by the plaintiff, because
the plaintiff did not impart a warranty of quality to his tires.' s The
court recognized that plaintiff had made certain representations in
advertising brochures but found that such representations did not
constitute a warranty.
9. See, e.g., Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 237 n.12, 246 A.2d
848, 857 n.12 (1968); Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Com-
pany, 396 Pa. 506, 512-13, 153 A.2d 472, 476 (1959); Michelin Tire Co. v.
Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 144, 145 A. 67, 68 (1929). Cf. Neville Chemical Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp. 422 F.2d 1205, 1228 (3d Cir. 1970); Smith v. Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company, 255 F. Supp. 905, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
10. Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 144, 145 A. 67, 68 (1929).
11. Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Company, 396 Pa.
506, 512-13, 153 A.2d 472, 476 (1959).
12. Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 237 n.12, 246 A.2d 848, 857
n.12 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d
1205, 1227 (3d Cir. 1970).
14. See, e.g., Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts, 73 YALE L.J.
199, 276-277 (1963). See also, C. McComvICK, DAMAGES, § 176 at 676
(1935).
15. 295 Pa. 140, 145 A. 67 (1929).
16. Id. at 140-41, 145 A. at 67-68.
17. Id. at 141, 145 A. at 68.
18. Id.
Justice Walling, writing for a unanimous court, rejected de-
fendant's counterclaim for loss of business caused by the alleged
inferiority of plaintiff's tires:
So far as appears, the tires in question were all used by
defendant's customers and paid for, so he lost nothing.
What he claims is that because the tires were less durable
than recommended he lost customers, which otherwise he
would have retained and whose business would have netted
him a profit in the amount he sets up as a counter-claim.
This is entirely too speculative and not the proper measure
of damages. Had there been a warranty of quality, which,
as we have seen, there was not, the true measure of dam-
ages, for breach thereof, would in general be the difference
between the value of the goods as warranted and those de-
livered .... 19
The court's criticism of the damages being "too speculative" was
fully warranted under the facts of the case. As the court noted:
Furthermore, the counterclaim is so indefinitely stated
as to be fatally defective. It fails to state the name of
plaintiff's agent who is alleged to have made the statements
as to the durability of the tires, or the name of a single cus-
tomer whose business defendant claims he lost or the
amount of his, the customer's, business or the profits
thereof which would have resulted. Mere columns of fig-
ures showing imaginary losses are insufficient.
20
In essence the defendant failed to plead any evidence tending to
substantiate his counterclaim.
Thirty years after Michelin the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was again confronted with the issue of whether loss of good will
was a compensable element of damages. In Harry Rubin & Sons v.
Consolidated Pipe Co.,21 the plaintiffs sought $50,000 for the loss of
good will and damage to their business reputation because of de-
fendant's breach of contract. 22 The plaintiffs contended that un-
der the Uniform Commercial Code an aggrieved party could re-
cover for loss of good will.2 3 The plaintiffs relied on Sections 2-713,
19. Id. Judge Walling noted:
No specific defect in the tires is averred, and the agreements by
which they were purchased contained no warranty of quality.
True, plaintiff's circulars stated that its tires had, under tests
given, and would average, 35 per cent more mileage than other
good tires . . . that the tires in question when used gave less, and
not more, mileage than other good tires .... A mere statement
as to quality, although extravagant or in the nature of puffing, is
not a warranty.Id.
20. Id. at 144, 145 A. at 68 (emphasis added).
21. 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
22. Id.
23. The plaintiff argued that:
Both section 2-713 and 2-715(2) authorize the buyer's loss of
good will, as an item of recoverable damage, contrary to the
holding of the court below. Plaintiffs should be allowed to show
that the defendants had reason to know that plaintiff's customers
were relying upon plaintiffs to deliver to them the hoops ordered
from defendants, and that another source of supply could not be
obtained in time to satisfy that expectation. On such proof plain-
Comments
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2-715 (2) and 1-106 (1) of the Uniform Commercial Code in support
of their contentions. 21 The defendants argued that loss of good will
was not a proper item of damages. The defendants grounded their
contentions on the theory that loss of good will is too speculative.
The defendants also contended that to permit recovery for loss of
good will would be contrary to established custom and usage.2 5
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the plaintiffs'
contentions and held that a buyer could not recover for injury to
good will and business reputation under Section 2-715(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. The court noted there was not any
existing judicial authority in Pennsylvania which would have sup-
ported recovery under the Uniform Sales Act, and elected to follow
the "too speculative for recovery" position set forth in Michelin.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Benjamin Jones stated:
Our research fails to reveal any judicial authority in
Pennsylvania which sustains under the Sales Act, a re-
covery for a loss of good will occasioned either by nonde-
livery or by the delivery of defective goods. As this court
stated in Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 144, 145
A. 67, 68, 'So far as appears the tires in question were all
used by defendant's customers and paid for, so he lost
nothing thereon. What he claims is that, because the tires
were less durable than recommended he lost customers.
• . . This is entirely too speculative and not the proper
measure of damages.' There is no indication that the Uni-
form Commercial Code was intended to enlarge the scope
of a buyer's damages to include a loss of good will. In the
absence of a specific declaration in this respect, we believe
that damages of this nature would be too speculative .... 26
The court's narrow interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code
tiffs should be able to recover for damage to their business repu-
tation in failing to serve their customers at a time when their
customers desired prompt delivery to take advantage of a great,
but short-term demand.
Brief for Appellant at 18, Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe
Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
24. Id. at 18-19.
25. Defendants stated that:
Loss of good will and business reputation is not a compensable
item of damage even by the most liberal construction of "conse-
quential damage." The many unknown factors which enter into
the term "good will" render a determination of its value highly
speculative, if not impossible. To hold a seller of goods, in the
event of his failure to deliver, liable for possible impairment of
the business reputation of the buyer or his loss of good will, would
impose a burden upon business contrary to one of the underlying
purpose expressed in Article 1-102 (2) (b) [UNIrORM COMMERCIAL
CODE] ....
Brief for Appellees at 12, Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe
Co., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).
26. 396 Pa. at 512-13, 153 A.2d at 476 (emphasis added).
is regrettable, and not fully warranted. As the plaintiff contended,
Section 2-715(2) (a) expressly provides for a buyer's recovery for
"any loss resulting from the general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know. .. ." One of the general or particular requirements which a
seller is held to know is the resale of the goods by the buyer.27 The
court appears to have ignored the rule of liberal construction 28 and
also the liberal administration of remedies provision provided for
by the Code.29 The court also elected to adopt the view of the Sec-
ond Circuit in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith,0 that to allow re-
covery for loss of good will would open the floodgates to allow re-
covery for almost anything when defective goods are sold.3 ' It is
difficult to justify the court's reliance on Armstrong. The New
York courts have indicated their willingness to allow recovery for
loss of good will as an element of special damages in proper cases,
3 2
contrary to the predictions of Judge Augustus Hand in Armstrong.33
As recently as 1968 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again
announced that it was wedded to the "too speculative for recovery"
dogma propagated by Michelin. In Kassab v. Central Soya, 4 after
abrogating the privity of contract requirement in implied warranty
cases, the court held that the owner of a cattle herd was entitled
to recover damages for the diminution of value of the herd which
occurred as a result of its ingesting defendant's harmful drug. The
plaintiffs contended that community knowledge of the effects of the
cattle feed on the herd resulted in his inability to sell his stock ex-
cept at beef prices. The court held the plaintiffs could recover for
the diminution in value of the herd if they could establish that the
decreased value was the proximate result of defendants' breach
of warranty.35 The court expressly relied on Section 2-715(2) (b) of
the Uniform Commercial Code as the basis for allowing recovery
if the plaintiffs could establish causation. 6 Mr. Justice Roberts,
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 6.
28. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
29. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106.
30. 43 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1930).
31. 396 Pa. at 512-13, 153 A.2d at 476.
32. See, e.g., Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v. Alpine Wine & Liquor Corp., 13
Misc. 2d 129, 178 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v. Al-
pine Wine & Liquor Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Associated
Spinners, Inc. v. Massachusetts Textile Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1958)
(recovery denied for other reasons). But see, Tracton v. A & 0 Novelties
Co., 32 Misc. 2d 991, 223 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
33. See notes 65-73 and accompanying text infra.
34. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
35. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 857.
36. Id. Section 2-715(2) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
vides that:
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach in-
clude...
(b) the injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715 (2) (b).
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writing the opinion of the court, noted that recovery was per-
missible regardless of whether the herd was actually harmed by
defendants' feed or whether the buying community just refused to
buy from the herd because they thought the cattle were subject to
reproductive disorders.37 In a footnote the court attempted to dis-
tinguish possible recovery by the plaintiffs in Kassab from the loss
of good will situation found in Rubin. The court explained recovery
in Kassab by stating:
Recovery for the diminution in value of specific prop-
erty caused by a refusal of the buying community to assign
a market value to that property equal to what it was
worth prior to its being affected by seller's defective prod-
uct must not be confused with recovery for loss of good will
to a business caused by community knowledge that the
seller's defective products were once used or sold by that
business. Since the loss of good will cannot be measured
by the diminution in value of any specific property belong-
ing to the aggrieved buyer, unlike the present case, such
good will loss is too speculative and hence not a compens-
able element of damages under section 2-715 of the code.
Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc. v. Consolidated Pipe Company of
America, Inc., 396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959).31
The court's basic distinction was, therefore, in a loss of good
will claim, the claimant cannot point to any specific piece of prop-
erty which has been injured by the seller's breach. From this
premise that the buyer cannot measure diminution of any specific
property, the court therefore concludes that any loss of good will
would be too speculative to permit recovery. It is submitted that
under Section 2-715(2) (a) of the Code, it is unnecessary for an ag-
grieved buyer to establish injury to any specific property. The
Code requires only that the buyer establish his extent of loss which
is reasonable under the circumstances.3 9 The Code expressly pro-
vides that consequential damages include "any loss resulting from
the general or particular requirements" of the buyer which the
37. 432 Pa. at 236-37, 246 A.2d at 857. Justice Roberts stated:
We believe that under section 2-715(2) (b) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code appellants should be allowed to recover for the
diminution in value of their cattle provided they can establish that
this diminution proximately resulted from appellees' breach of
warranty. It does not matter whether the cattle lost value be-
cause they in fact could not reproduce, or because no one in the
community would buy them out of a reasonable fear that the
stilbestrol they ate might cause reproductive disorders. For, if
either be true, it can be fairly said that appellant's property has
been damaged due to the feed sold by appellees.
Id. at 236-37, 246 A.2d at 857.
38. Id. at 237 n.12, 246 A.2d at 857, n.12 (emphasis added).
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 3. See also, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106, comment 1.
seller had reason to know at the time of contracting.4 0  It is sub-
mitted that the language of Section 2-715 (2) (a) of the Code is suf-
ficiently broad to encompass loss of good will as a recoverable ele-
ment of damages if the aggrieved buyer can establish the extent
of his loss in a reasonable manner.41  A review of pre-Uniform
Commercial Code cases indicates a willingness of several jurisdic-
tions to permit recovery of damages for loss of good will under the
consequential damage provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.
Loss OF GOOD WILL UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT
As early as 1929 Pennsylvania announced that loss of good will
was not a compensable element of damages under the applicable
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. 42 A 1928 decision of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, predated Michelin, and allowed
recovery for loss of good will. In the landmark case of Barrett
Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co.,4 3 the court held that a $20,000
award for loss of good will was permissible under the Uniform
Sales Act.44 The court grounded its decision on the obvious fact
that the defective materials supplied by the seller had been in-
troduced into commerce under the buyer's trade mark, and the
unmerchantability of the products would have a lasting effect on
the image of the buyer's product. The court upheld the $20,000
award to the buyer for loss of good will, stating:
The record shows that in 1920 the plaintiff had a large
business, and that this business was acquired by years of a
competent course of manufacture and sale. . . . This busi-
ness was 98 per cent heels. The testimony of competent
witnesses shows that the reputation of its product was high
with jobbing trade and its heels were 'easy to sell.' It be-
comes evident that there was a substantial degree of good
will. It appears that, as a result of defendant's action, the
plaintiff put out into the trade about three-quarters of a
million dollars worth of heels which proved unmerchant-
able. These heels were largely scattered in the trade, to the
lasting detriment of the reputation of plaintiff's product.45
The court allowed recovery without insisting upon a showing of
mathematical accuracy. The court recognized that loss of good
40. UmmROmu COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (a). See also, notes 5, 6,
and 7 supra and accompanying text.
41. But see, W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES 141 (1958). Dean
Hawkland suggests:
But [2-715] does not seem to permit speculative damages, and,
consequently, expected profits are not allowed by it, unless they
clearly would have been earned. By the same token, the buyer
should not be permitted to speculate as to the loss of profits re-
sulting from the alienation of customers. This is all taken care of
by imposing upon the buyer the burden of proving the extent of
the loss by way of customer alienation.
Id. at 141.
42. See, e.g., Michelin Tire Co. v. Schulz, 295 Pa. 140, 145 A. 67 (1929).
43. 24 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1928).
44. Id.
45. 24 F.2d at 337.
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will is not susceptible to precise determination, but must be gauged
by approximation.
46
The courts of New York have also recognized that loss of good
will should be a permissible element of special damages by an ag-
grieved buyer under the Uniform Sales Act. 47 Cramerton Mills v.
Nathan & Cohen Co.,48 sustained the sufficiency of a defendant-
cloth merchant's counterclaims for loss of good will against a
plaintiff-manufacturer who supplied defective cloth. It should be
noted that the court in Cramerton was not faced with the issue of
whether the defendant had established the extent of its loss of good
will but rather whether the defendant had a right to recover dam-
ages for loss of good will.49 The court held that the defendant "may
recover, as special damages, the amount of injury which it has sus-
tained to its business, reputation and good will. ' 50 The basis for the
court's decision was section 69(6) of the Uniform Sales Act which
provides:
The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the loss
directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of
events, from the breach of warranty. 51
The court expressly rejected the difference in value measure of
damages provision of the Uniform Sales Act.52 The court found
that special circumstances of the defendant established proximate
damage greater than the difference between the value of the goods
46. Id.
47. See cases cited note 32 supra.
48. 231 App. Div. 28, 246 N.Y.S. 259 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
49. Id. at 34, 246 N.Y.S. at 267.
50. Id. It is interesting to note that the court considered good will
to be a property right which was injured by plaintiff's breach of warranty.
The court stated:
In our opinion special damages alleged in the answer are recover-
able by defendant-appellant from plaintiff or from its assignor
... as the proximate result of the breach of warranty made
upon the sale of goods in question to defendant-appellant. These
special damages do not consist of loss of profits but flow from an
alleged serious injury to the defendant's reputation and good will
caused by the defective goods delivered to defendant-appellant
and which it converted and sold and delivered to its customers.
[T]he defendant . .. enjoyed a reputation for dealing in goods
of the highest type and quality. Such good will and business
reputation constituted a valuable property right, and the defend-
ant-appellant may recover the damage which it sustained flowing
directly from the delivery to it of goods of faulty manufacture
resulting in the ultimate alienation of its customers.
Id. at 34, 246 N.Y.S. at 267. Compare with Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
217, 237 n.12, 246 A.2d 848, 857 n.12 (1968).
51. UNIFmRx SALES ACT § 69(6).
52. 231 App. Div. at 34, 246 N.Y.S. at 267. For discussion of the
difference in value provision of the UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 69(7) see note
5 supra.
at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value the goods would
have had if they answered to the warranty. 5 The court also placed
substantial reliance on the pre-Uniform Sales Act decision of Swain
v. Schieffelin 4 and also Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co. 5
In Swain, the manufacturer of ice cream was permitted to re-
cover the loss of good will caused by two druggists who sup-
plied the manufacturer with a dangerous poison instead of a harm-
less food coloring ordered by the ice cream maker. The court dis-
cussed the general contract principle which would limit damages
for breach of warranty of quality to the difference in value test, and
rejected its application to the ice cream maker. Instead, the court
suggested:
In case a manufacturer of goods sells them to a purchaser
to be used for a particular purpose, which is known by the
vendor at the time of the sale, a more liberal rule prevails
than in cases where like articles are sold as merchandise, for
general purposes.18
The basis for the rule is simply that a seller, with knowledge of
the buyer's particular purpose, should be liable for
[s]uch damages as naturally flow from the breach of his
contract and which he, or any reasonable man, might appre-
hend would follow from the breach.
7
Two New York cases have cast doubt upon the recovery of dam-
ages for loss of good will in a breach of warranty action. In Moran
v. Standard Oil Co.,58 Judge Cardozo refused to permit recovery of
damages for alienation of customers because of defects in the de-
fendant's paint. The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove his
loss with reasonable certainty.5 The court did recognize, however,
53. The special circumstances found to exist by the court included:
a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; knowledge by the seller of
the proposed use of the goods intended by the buyer, presence of a latent
defect undiscoverable by the buyer, and knowledge that the goods would
be converted and resold by the buyer. 231 App. Div. at 34, 246 N.Y.S. at
267-68.
54. 131 N.Y. 474, 31 N.E. 1025 (1892).
55. 24 F.2d 329 (Ist Cir. 1928).
56. 131 N.Y. at 476, 31 N.E. at 1026.
57. Id.
58. 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914).
59. Id. at 192, 105 N.E. at 219. The plaintiff attempted to establish his
loss of trade through the introduction of a schedule which purported to
represent his loss of profits because of alienation of customers. The sched-
ule consisted of a compilation of customer's names, date of last transaction
with the customer, and the amount of profit which plaintiff estimated he
would have received if the customer continued to do business with him.
Judge Cardozo rejected the plaintiff's method of proof stating:
There was no proof of the extent or number of the sales which the
plaintiff had made to any of the customers on the list. There was
nothing beyond the fact that he had dealt with them, that the
dealings had ceased, and that they told him that his unsatisfactory
paint was the cause of their defection ... The plaintiff did not
place before the jury the volume of his business with each cus-
tomer, and the circumstances tending to show the reasons for the
breaking off of their dealings. If that had been done, it may be
Comments
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that plaintiff did have a right to recover for his losses because the
defendant had promised to remedy any losses of the plaintiff caused
by the defective paint.6 0 Judge Cardozo made one sweeping state-
ment which has been adopted by a number of courts to deny re-
covery for loss of good will."' Judge Cardozo formulated a general
rule that
[w]hen defective goods are sold, the measure of damages
does not include the profits lost from the vendee's failure to
resell them, unless such a loss is proved to have been within
the contemplation of the parties. . . . Still less does it in-
clude the loss of profits resulting from the alienation of
the customers. We may assume that such losses would be
recoverable if the vendor undertook to indemnify against
them; but they ought to be proved with reasonable cer-
tainty. . . The plaintiff failed to satisfy that requirement
and his verdict may not stand.
2
In Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Griffith," the Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit held that a district court had properly excluded
evidence of defendant's injury to his businesss reputation. The de-
fendant contended that he was entitled to special damages for in-
jury to his business reputation in a counterclaim alleging breach of
warranty against the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant
could not avail himself of the special damages provision of the Uni-
form Sales Act,64 because there were not any special circumstances
to warrant its application. The court rejected the contention that a
seller's knowledge that the goods were to be resold, and if defective,
would cause the buyer a loss of profits, was sufficient to constitute
special circumstances.6 5
that the jury from such premises might have reached a conclu-
sion as to the resulting loss of profits.
Id. at 192, 105 N.E. at 219.
60. Id. at 191, 105 N.E. at 218.
61. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d
363 (5th Cir. 1964); Allied Chemical Corp. v. Eubanks Industries, Inc., 155
So. 2d 740 (Fla. App. 1963).
62. 211 N.Y. at 192, 105 N.E. at 220.
63. 43 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1930).
64. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(7).
65. 43 F.2d at 690. The court stated:
The question is whether there were any "special circumstances" in
the present case which entitled the defendant to recover damages
for loss of his good will. Knowledge that the goods are to be
resold, and, if defective, will be the occasion of a loss of profits is
not enough to justify an award of special damages.
Id. at 690.
The view that knowledge that the goods are to he resold is not a spe-
cial circumstance appears to be rejected under the Code. See, e.g., UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 6 which states:
In the case of sale of wares to one in the business of reselling them,
resale is one of the requirements of which the seller has reason to
It is suggested that Armstrong Rubber was decided on the
ground of public policy. Although the court cast its rationale in
terms of damages not within the contemplation of the parties, 66 it is
apparent that the court feared that recovery of good will damages
would open the floodgate for recovery of all types of damages
without limitation. Judge Hand expressed the fear of the court
when he stated:
If the plaintiff here can recover for loss of good will, it is
difficult to see what limits are to be set to the recovery of
such damages in any case where defective goods are sold
and the vendee loses customers. Indeed, if such were the
holding, damages which the parties never contemplated
would seem to be involved in every contract of sale.'7
In arriving at its decision the court discounted Swain v. Schieff lin6s
as not being the law of New York,69 and distinguished Barrett Co. v.
Panther Rubber Mfg. Co.,70 as involving an implied warranty for a
particular purpose. 71 The court concluded that existing case law,
72
"as well as what we regard as the most sound dictates of public
policy, would seem to preclude a recovery here for loss of good
will., 73
Later New York cases appear to have spurned Armstrong Rub-
ber and Moran and have recognized the right of a buyer to recover
damages for injury to business reputation and good will.7 4 Al-
though the recovery of damages for injury to good will has been
limited to instances where there has been a warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose,75 there is some indication that the New
know within the meaning of subsection (2) (a) [of § 2-715].
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715, comment 6 (emphasis added).
66. 43 F.2d at 690-91. Judge Augustus N. Hand, writing the opinion
of the court stated:
We can hardly doubt that such an uncertain and perilous risk as
indemnification against loss through alienation of customers was
never contemplated by the plaintiff in this case. Nothing was said
about it in the negotiations between the parties, and it seems quite
unlikely that it should have been intended.
Id. at 690-91.
67. Id. at 691.
68. 134 N.Y. 471, 31 N.E. 1025 (1892).
69. 43 F.2d at 691.
70. 24 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1928).
71. 43 F.2d at 691. The court correctly pointed out that Barrett in-
volved an implied warranty for a particular purpose. In Barrett, the buyer
specifically relied on the seller's skill and judgment. In Armstrong Rub-
ber, the buyer purchased tires for resale in the general trade, and not for a
particular purpose as the oil in Barrett.
72. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903);
Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N.Y. 187, 105 N.E. 217 (1914).
73. 43 F.2d at 691.
74. See, e.g., Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v. Alpine Wine & Liquor Corp., 13
Misc. 2d 129, 178 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v.
Alpine Wine & Liquor Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Associated
Spinners, Inc. v. Massachusetts Textile Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(damages not allowed because of contract provisions, and failure to allege
goods sold for a specific purpose).
75. See, e.g., Swain v. Schiefflin, 134 N.Y. 471, 31 N.E. 1025 (1892);
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York courts may be willing to allow recovery where there is not a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.71
Other courts have also recognized the loss of good will or loss
of reputation as a recoverable element of damages. 77 Courts which
recognize the recovery of such loss reject contentions that loss of
good will is too speculative to permit recovery.
78
In Stott v. Johnston,7 the Supreme Court of California upheld
a judgment of $10,000 in damages in favor of a house painter who
used defendant's defective paint.8 0 The court unequivocally re-
jected defendant's arguments that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
could not recover damages for loss of good will because injury to
good will is too speculative to permit recovery of damages. The
court held that such damages were properly allowed under the
authority of Cramerton Mills, Royal Paper Box Co. v. Munro &
Church Co.,8 ' and sections 69(6) and (7) of the Uniform Sales Act,
if there was evidentiary support to establish such damages. An
underlying reason, which was not fully articulated by the court, is
that a plaintiff should not be denied recovery when it is certain that
injury has resulted but there is uncertainty as to the amount.
8 2
As the court noted:
[U] pon submitting the damage issue to the jury, the court
defined 'good will of a business . . . as the expectation of
continued public patronage.' . . . It is not open to argu-
ment that the sale of defective paint to a successful paint-
ing contractor-which results in his painting 50 or more
houses and buildings with the paint and it then begins to
'peel, crack, discolor, powder and come off' within six
months or less-can do serious harm to his reputation as a
painting contractor in that particular community.8
The court found that loss of good will must have been within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting because of
Cramerton Mills, Inc. v. Nathan & Cohen Co., 231 App. Div. 28, 246 N.Y.S.
259 (Sup. Ct. 1930). See also Associated Spinners Inc. v. Massachusetts
Textile Co., 75 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
76. See, e.g., Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v. Alpine Wine & Liquor Corp., 13
Misc. 2d 129, 178 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Log Cabin Rest, Inc. v.
Alpine Wine & Liquor Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
77. See, e.g., Isenberg v. Lemon, 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d 1016 (1958);
Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); Sol-O-Lite Laminating
Corp. v. Allen, 223 Ore. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960). See also, Superwood Cor-
poration v. Larson-Stang, Inc., 311 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1963).
78. See cases cited note 76 supra.
79. 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951).
80. Id. at 868, 229 P.2d at 352.
81. 284 Mass. 446, 188 N.E. 223 (1933).
82. 36 Cal. 2d at 868, 229 P.2d at 352.
83. Id.
the factors surrounding the transaction.84
In Sol-O-Lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen,8 5 the Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed a $1,000 verdict for breach of warranty and
damages to defendant Allen's business good will. The court found
plaintiff's objections that damage to good will was too remote and
speculative to be without merit. Although the court acknowledged
that damage to good will is not capable of exact determination, it de-
clined to adhere to the principle of denying recovery for injury to
good will:
We believe it is a proper basis for the recovery of damages
in an otherwise adequate case of breach of warranty
where, . . ., there is evidence that the seller knew the
goods were being purchased for resale for a use which re-
quired a certain standard of clarity and that they were
being resold with similar goods which were sold under the
purchaser's trade name. Such damages then can hardly
be said not to be within the contemplation of the parties.81
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in Isenberg v.
Lemon,87 recognized the right of a purchaser to recover damages for
loss of good will for a breach of warranty by the vendor. The court,
without extensive discussion, found that the vendor knew the pur-
chaser was procuring paint for resale to painting contractors. Al-
though the court rejected Lemon's evidence of his amount of loss, it
did note that Lemon did lose the business of large paint contractors
because of Isenberg's inferior product."'
It is submitted that under the foregoing decisions the right to
recover damages for injury to business good will was recognized
under the Uniform Sales Act by the Courts of Arizona, California,
New York, and Oregon. Generally, recovery must be predicated
on a showing of actual injury to business good will. While such in-
jury is not capable of precise determination, it is not too remote or
speculative to permit recovery. An aggrieved purchaser may es-
tablish injury to his good will by establishing loss of customers and
business following the resale of the vendor's product. An aggrieved
buyer must be careful, however, to establish a casual connection
between the vendor's defective merchandise and the resulting loss
of patronage.
In Sol-O-Lite, the buyer not only established his loss of busi-
ness through decreased profits, he also had his salesmen recount
"in detail their trials or tribulations with customers who had re-
ceived the defective material."9 The salesmen testified that former
customers would refuse to continue to do business with them 0
84. Id.
85. 223 Ore. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960).
86. Id. at 88, 353 P.2d at 850.
87. 84 Ariz. 340, 327 P.2d 1016 (1958).
88. Id.
89. 223 Ore. 87, 353 P.2d at 849.
90. Id., 353 P.2d at 849-50.
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The buyer also had four former customers called as witnesses. The
former customers testified that after receipt of the defective paint
they had reduced or terminated their dealings with the buyer.
Implicit in Stott, and its progeny,91 is that a buyer may re-
cover damages for loss of good will because of seller's breach of war-
ranty, where goods are sold for a particular purpose which the
seller knows at the time of contracting and where the buyer relies
on the seller's skill and judgment. Although the requirements of
sale of goods for a particular purpose and reliance on the seller's
skill and judgment do not appear to be prerequisites under the
Code, it is submitted that the existence of such facts would con-
stitute special circumstances justifying recovery of consequential
damages under the Code.92 The decisions of other jurisdictions
fully support the recovery of damages for loss of good will or busi-
ness reputation under the Code, if such damages can be established
by a reasonable method.93 Although the cases which allow recovery
have been generally within the area of breach of warranty actions,
it is submitted that under the Code recovery of damages for loss of




The existing Pennsylvania view would prohibit an aggrieved
buyer from attempting to establish damages for loss of good will at
the pleading stages. The Pennsylvania view does not distinguish
between recovery of damages for loss of good will in breach of war-
ranty actions and recovery of damages for loss of good will in a
breach of contract for non-delivery action. In either instance re-
covery for injury to good will is denied.
The Pennsylvania view is inconsistent with the broad provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code which allow recovery for
"any loss" 95 resulting from the seller's breach. It is submitted that
the pre-Code cases which permit recovery of damages for loss of
good will are consistent with the consequential damage provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Such cases recognize the right of
an aggrieved buyer to recover damages for loss of good will if he
can establish such damages by a reasonable method. A basic dis-
91. See cases cited at note 77 supra.
92. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-714(2), (3); 2-715(2)
(a), and comments thereto.
93. See cases cited at note 77 supra.
94. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2). See also, Walpole v. Pre-
fab Mfg. Co., 103 Cal. App. 472, 230 P.2d 36 (1951).
95. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715.
tinction between the Pennsylvania cases and those cases which
recognize a right to damages for injury to good will is that the latter
allow the aggrieved buyer to attempt to show his damages while the
Pennsylvania cases prohibit the aggrieved buyer from attempting
to establish his injury. The Pennsylvania courts dispose of the mat-
ter by holding that such damages are too speculative for recovery.
Courts which recognize the right of the aggrieved buyer to recover
damages for loss of good will insist that such damages be established
by reasonable proof. If the aggrieved buyer fails to establish his
damages, he is precluded from recovery. The distinction is that the
buyer has the opportunity of proving his injury. Pennsylvania pre-
cludes such proof.
In light of the liberal provisions of the Code, it is submitted
that a buyer should be allowed to prove his injury to good will in
either a non-delivery or breach of warranty action. Although the
buyer's burden of proof will be a difficult one to carry, it is sub-
mitted that such damages can be established in instances of actual
damage to good will and business reputation.
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